Studying Moscow’s Coercive Campaign Against Norway

Russia’s increasingly self-assertive and revisionist foreign and security policy may not have received sufficient attention in the West until the sudden and illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014. Although the seizure sent geopolitical shockwaves into capitals around the world, the subsequent political response did not deter President Vladimir Putin from attempting to subjugate the whole of Ukraine in 2022. These two watershed events – the latter of which is still unfolding – have led to an almost complete collapse in relations with the West, including Norway, one of Russia’s immediate neighbours.

From Norway’s perspective, the deterioration in bilateral relations since 2014 has been visible through the degradation of political dialogue, cases of espionage, cyber attacks and a substantial increase in coercive military activity, as described in the following sections. From the Russian perspective, its security concerns related to Norway seem primarily linked to Norway’s administration and use of Svalbard, the presence of NATO forces in Norway and in its adjoining seas, and the Norwegian sanctions policy. Historically, these matters have been insufficient cause for escalation as Russia has had an enduring interest in ‘preserving the Arctic as a territory of peace’, isolated from conflicts elsewhere.Footnote¹ Nevertheless, Russia’s renewed invasion of Ukraine makes it evident that its risk perception and acceptance exceeds traditional parameters, making its foreign policy conduct and role as an actor in the international system unpredictable.

This article explores Moscow’s campaign to influence and coerce Oslo into complying with its foreign and security policy objectives in the timeframe between 2014 and early 2023. These efforts can be grouped into the political, information and military domains where activities have remained under the threshold for armed conflict. Although the primary focus of this article is on Norway, it is important to recognise that Russia’s actions are not isolated incidents. Indeed, several of the actions taken by Russia against Norway are reflective of its broader patterns of behaviour towards other NATO partners. Therefore, this article should be considered a case study in Russian coercive actions to influence political decision-making, highlighting the comprehensive nature of Moscow’s disruptive actions and contributing to increased awareness of the wider phenomenon.

Diplomacy: Norway is a Member of NATO; NATO is not a Friend of Russia

Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 is considered a turning point in Russo-Norwegian relations. Shortly after the annexation, Norway implemented sanctions in line with those of the EU. In turn, Russia is believed to have orchestrated the subsequent refugee crisis at the Russo-Norwegian border crossing station in Storskog in the last quarter of 2015. According to former prime minister Erna Solberg, Russia did this by assisting or allowing more than 5,000 refugees from various conflict zones to seek asylum at the border.Footnote² This represented a significant increase compared with the first half of 2015, when only 40 people applied for asylum at the border.Footnote³ The situation bears similarities to the 2021 migration crisis on the border between the EU and Belarus, where Alexander Lukashenko’s regime used illegal immigration as a political weapon in response to Western and EU sanctions.Footnote⁴

A Norwegian F-35 A on NATO Quick Reaction Alert intercepting a Russian TU-95MS ‘BEAR-H’ near Norwegian airspace. Courtesy of Forsvaret/Norwegian Armed Forces

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In another instance of political manoeuvring, Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov used the 2020 centenary of the Svalbard Treaty to formally protest violations of the treaty on the grounds of discrimination against Russian economic activity in the archipelago, demanding bilateral negotiations. However, Oslo dismissed the demand on the grounds that ‘Norway does not negotiate with anyone over what is Norwegian’, causing outrage in the Russian media.Footnote⁵ Although the protest was based on allegations of economic discrimination against Russia’s symbolic Arktikugol coal mining company in Barentsburg, the underlying concern was likely related to the geostrategic location of Svalbard in relation to Russia’s strategic nuclear forces on the Kola Peninsula. That is also why the Svalbard satellite station (SvalSat) has been criticised by Russian officials who claim that the facility serves dual-use purposes.Footnote⁶ SvalSat is operated by the part government-owned Kongsberg Satellite Services (KSAT) and the Norwegian Space Agency and is vital in communicating with satellites in low polar orbit.

In May 2021, the Russian Embassy in Oslo openly criticised Norway for alleged violations of its self-imposed 1949 basing policy, which includes restrictions on foreign military presence in Norway.Footnote⁷ Specifically, the Embassy stated that Norway had allowed US nuclear attack submarines and strategic bombers to use Norwegian ports and airports, which it argued violated the 1949 policy.Footnote⁸ The Embassy also criticised the 2021 US-Norwegian Supplementary Defense Cooperation Agreement (SDCA), which grants the US increased jurisdiction over its military personnel and infrastructure within defined areas in Norway, enables joint training and exercises, sharing of military infrastructure and technology, and cooperation on security challenges.Footnote⁹

Relations deteriorated further on 25 October 2021, when Lavrov met with his newly appointed Norwegian counterpart, Anniken Huitfeldt. In the subsequent statement to the press, he announced that ‘Norway is a member of NATO, and NATO is not a friend of Russia’.Footnote¹⁰ Lavrov’s statement represented continuity in de facto relations since 2014, however, his directness in challenging the cornerstone of Norwegian security policy signalled change.

Following Russia’s attempted full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Norway implemented sanctions mirroring those of the EU, and continues to supply Ukraine with military hardware and funds. This resulted in Moscow listing Norway as a ‘nation unfriendly to Russia’.Footnote¹¹ In addition, in July 2022 Russian politicians suggested invalidating the much-celebrated 2010 Russo-Norwegian maritime delimitation treaty – the result of four decades of negotiations – as an indirect, punitive response to Norwegian sanctions. The reaction from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has so far been that the treaty does not have a clause on termination.Footnote¹²

Despite the entrenched political positions, the Norwegian Intelligence Service (NIS) assesses that Moscow considers its diplomatic means the most influential towards Oslo, followed by – or reinforced with – military power projection.Footnote¹³ Therefore, Russia’s diplomatic signalling must also be seen in conjunction with the other instruments of Russian power, such as its ‘information confrontations’ and military force demonstrations.

Information and Disinformation: Conflicting Narratives

As part of Russia’s whole-of-government approach to its foreign and security policy objectives, its diplomatic efforts are regularly supported by information and cyber operations to reinforce the Russian narrative, while sowing doubts about – or discrediting – the competing narrative.Footnote¹⁴ Such ‘weaponisation of information’ is within the domain of ‘information confrontation’, a uniquely Russian term that includes information and cyber operations.Footnote¹⁵

In 2022, all three Norwegian security services (the Norwegian Intelligence Service (NIS), the Police Security Service (PST), and the National Security Authority (NSM)) renewed their warnings of there being a high and persistent threat posed by Russian state and non-state actors in spreading disinformation and conducting cyber operations.Footnote¹⁶ According to the three services, Russian state or state-affiliated actors are the most severe threats to Norwegian domestic security interests and actively attempt to influence the government’s decision-making processes, limit strategic options and weaken Norwegian national security interests.Footnote¹⁷

According to the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI), Norway is likely not among Russia’s most prioritised targets. However, there is a persistent effort by Russia’s GRU (foreign military intelligence) and SVR (foreign intelligence service) in Norway.Footnote¹⁸ Their general objectives are likely ‘to weaken Western democracies through increased polarization, weakening public confidence in the government, and undermining and manipulating the perception of reality to both its own and other countries’ populations’.Footnote¹⁹ It is also likely that their specific objectives towards Norway are to ‘influence attitudes in the Norwegian population and Norway’s position in international politics’ due to its geostrategic location, in combination with it being a NATO member.Footnote²⁰ Furthermore, the FFI report states that ‘Russian authorities and personnel at the Russian Embassy in Oslo are active, both through diplomacy, intelligence, lobbying, and editorial and social media activity’.Footnote²¹ Recently, on 13 April 2023, Norwegian authorities expelled 15 persons employed at the Russian Embassy in Oslo on the grounds that ‘their activities are a threat to Norwegian interests’ according to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Anniken Huitfeldt.Footnote²²

Russian information operations are often based on official statements to the Russian and international media, at times reinforced by ambiguous or unattributable sources spreading disinformation via social media and other decentralised platforms.Footnote²³ While Russian official statements may provide consistent – although alternative – narratives, other unattributable sources are to a greater degree used for spreading disinformation and conflicting narratives aimed at exploiting perceived vulnerabilities in democratic societies by attempting to exacerbate divisions, thereby seeking to degrade societal cohesion.Footnote²⁴

A consistent trend in Moscow’s official statements is that the Norwegian government is manipulating public opinion related to Russo-Norwegian bilateral relations. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesperson Maria Zakharova goes as far as claiming that ‘Norwegians are being misled [by] Oslo’.Footnote²⁵ Also, Moscow has occasionally attempted to exploit perceived divisions in Norway through statements such as ‘Oslo is ignorant of the security of “northerners”’ by allowing US submarines to enter its northern ports. Although Moscow is failing to gain traction in its information campaign, it clearly shows that Moscow pays attention to Norwegian politics to identify areas where it can inflame societal divisions.Footnote²⁶

In another case of ‘weaponisation of disinformation’, Russia has resorted to falsifying Automatic Identification System (AIS) location data.Footnote²⁷ One such incident involved Royal Norwegian Navy (RNoN) vessels operating in the Baltic Sea on 14 June 2020. According to publicly available Marine Traffic AIS data, the two RNoN corvettes operating in the region falsely appeared to have violated Russian territorial waters outside the Kaliningrad enclave as a consequence of AIS receiver stations being fed falsified location data by non-attributable cyber-actors.Footnote²⁸ Although this incident did not involve actual ships emitting the false location data, other incidents did. According to information disclosed through the Norwegian Freedom of Information Act, the RNoN points to Russia as a likely source of such disinformation in at least one specific case in September 2020, where two Russian warships operating between Norway and Denmark emitted AIS signals identifying them as Norwegian and Danish frigates.Footnote²⁹

Norwegian Department of Defence spokespersons stated that an adversary may have multiple purposes for falsifying location data. The manipulation of location information is seen as a broadening of ongoing disinformation campaigns in social media and the press aimed at undermining the credibility and reliability of governments and institutions in the West. Furthermore, in case of a confrontation at sea, falsified information may be used to substantiate false claims or to support allegations of violations of sovereign states’ territorial waters, thereby adding to the Russian narrative that it is surrounded by aggressors.Footnote³⁰ Another aspect is that the demonstration of such capacities and capabilities is likely to support Russia’s wider strategic deterrence signalling. In another noteworthy event, Putin signed the Russian Federation’s 2022 Maritime Doctrine on 31 July 2022. This doctrine places an increased emphasis on employing civilian vessels for military purposes, potentially further blurring the lines between combatants and non-combatants at sea.Footnote³¹

Another trend is Russia’s continuous effort to export its ‘memorial diplomacy’ to Norway.Footnote³² In particular, this can be seen through the continued emphasis on constructing and maintaining public memorial sites in the north-eastern region of Finnmark, which was liberated from German occupation in 1944 by the Soviet Red Army. Commentators suggest that this is part of a broader strategy by Russia to cultivate a sense of gratitude and obligation from the Norwegian side.Footnote³³ This approach may also seek to divert attention from negative publicity and reinforce a positive image of Russia.

The overall effects sought by Moscow in its information operations are likely two-fold. On the one hand, it aims to construct a narrative through official statements or Russian and Norwegian media that Oslo is ignoring Russia’s interests and misleading its population by offering its territory to NATO as a springboard from which to threaten Russia’s security interests. On the other hand, this feeds into a domestic narrative in Russia, where Norway and NATO are portrayed as aggressive and encroaching on Russian sovereignty. Taken together, Russia’s signalling could be considered an active information campaign and is likely aimed at undermining public trust in the Norwegian government and influencing government decision-making.

According to NSM, cyber attacks causing serious consequences tripled from 2019 to 2021.Footnote³⁴ Although most were of criminal character, some also targeted Norwegian national security interests. These attacks target academic or government institutions and companies possessing advanced manufacturing technologies. NSM claims that the attacks aim to gain insight into government policymaking and to access otherwise inaccessible technology.Footnote³⁵ The majority of such attacks remain either unattributable or are otherwise ambiguous. This is further complicated by the fact that several attacks are attributed to third-party actors, thereby creating sufficient ambiguity to remain plausibly deniable by their suspected sponsor. It is also likely that some state or state-sponsored cyber attacks have remained undiscovered due to the increasingly sophisticated means and ways of such activities.Footnote³⁶

However, in late 2014, an advanced network of false GSM transceiver stations was discovered in the vicinity of the parliament and government administration buildings in Oslo and is assumed to have been monitoring government officials.Footnote³⁷ The system’s sophistication indicated that foreign state actors were involved, but the incident was not publicly attributed. In 2020, the Norwegian parliament’s email system came under attack from what the PST and NSM attributed to the ‘Fancy Bear’ (APT-28) cyber espionage group affiliated with GRU.Footnote³⁸ In a historic move, the Norwegian MFA publicly attributed the incident to Russia, calling it an unacceptable attack on Norway’s democratic interests.Footnote³⁹ In 2022, the University of Tromsø was subjected to a cyber attack in which the attackers targeted the email accounts of security policy researchers; a PST investigation later attributed the attack to Russia.Footnote⁴⁰ Later the same year, a ‘Brazilian’ researcher was arrested at Tromsø university and charged with espionage. According to the PST, the researcher’s real identity was that of a Russian national.Footnote⁴¹ Open-source investigator Christo Grozev at Bellingcat, however, claims that the person is a GRU colonel.Footnote⁴²

Another factor of note is Russia’s covert or overt attempts to gain access to advanced technology. While covert attempts are in the realm of industrial espionage, overt efforts involve attempted purchases of products or companies.Footnote⁴³ According to the NIS and PST, there is a particular demand for Norwegian maritime and other advanced technology. This was exemplified by the Russian Trans Mash Holding’s attempt to buy the Rolls Royce Group subsidiary Bergen Engines in 2021.Footnote⁴⁴ The Norwegian government prohibited the sale based on concerns that the company had strong ties to Russian authorities. It is believed that the acquisition of Bergen Engines, which specialises in manufacturing large ship engines for customers such as the Norwegian and US navies, would once again enable the construction of larger Russian naval vessels after losing access to such engines following its 2014 invasion of Crimea.Footnote⁴⁵

Overall, Russian activity in the information and cyber domains appears to be part of a comprehensive approach, which includes disinformation and espionage, aimed at influencing government decision-making, undermining democratic processes, and acquiring otherwise inaccessible information and technology.

Military: Combining Old Concepts with New Approaches

Despite Moscow’s stated ambition of keeping tensions low in the Arctic, there are several examples of ways in which the Russian military is being used to signal disagreements with Oslo, especially since the 2014 degradation of political relations.

In 2015, Russia’s deputy prime minister, Dmitry Rogozin, made an unannounced visit to Longyearbyen in Svalbard despite being on Norway’s 2014 sanctions list of persons prohibited from entering the country.Footnote⁴⁶ Furthermore, Chechen special forces affiliated with the Russian FSB’s Alpha group made a stopover in Longyearbyen in 2016, allegedly on their way to an exercise near the North Pole.Footnote⁴⁷ Norwegian Svalbard policy clearly states that ‘all foreign military activity in Svalbard is prohibited and would entail a gross infringement of Norway’s sovereignty’.Footnote⁴⁸ Such actions are highly problematic and pose severe challenges to the 1920 Svalbard Treaty by exploiting the grey zone in the treaty’s definition of ‘military activity’.

In 2017, a Russian defence report on threats to its national interests identified Norway as a specific threat by what the report described as Norway’s ‘unilateral revision of international agreements’, likely in reference to the Svalbard Treaty, and its move ‘towards establishing absolute national jurisdiction over Spitsbergen [Svalbard] and the adjacent 200 nautical mile boundary around it’.Footnote⁴⁹ Additionally, Russian state-affiliated media outlets openly questioned the legitimacy of Norway’s claim to the archipelago, clearly seeking to inflame a revisionist debate.Footnote⁵⁰

According to the treaty, Svalbard is not to be used for ‘war-like purposes’. Therefore, Norwegian military use of Svalbard is limited to essential and non-permanent activities (including Coast Guard visits and military aircraft conducting civil transportation and search-and-rescue operations).Footnote⁵¹ Since the mid-2000s, there has also been an annual visit by an RNoN frigate to the archipelago. This routinely draws criticism from Moscow; however, Russia’s 2021 MFA statement was particularly explicit:

Interestingly, the 2021 RNoN visit to Svalbard was followed by what appears to be a response by the Northern Fleet (NFLT). Although the NFLT has conducted annual ‘Arctic voyages’ for the past decade, the 2021 voyage deviated from previous years when the destroyer Severomorsk and two support vessels set course for the waters around Svalbard. The NFLT stated that the ships were sent to carry out ‘a set of measures aimed at protecting the interests of the Russian Federation in the Arctic’.Footnote⁵³ According to a Norwegian Joint Headquarters spokesperson, such behaviour had not been seen before.Footnote⁵⁴ Although the NFLT’s land component has suffered severe losses in Ukraine, its air and maritime component continues to create a considerable regional asymmetry.

The Russian air force is also being used to relay Moscow’s dissatisfaction with Norwegian policy and has conducted several simulated strikes on Norwegian installations and vessels in recent years. In a 2018 speech, the former Chief of the NIS, Morten Haga Lunde, disclosed that Russia conducted three separate simulated airstrikes on Norwegian facilities and vessels in 2017.Footnote⁵⁵ According to Lunde, the coercive air campaign began with nine aircraft conducting repeated simulated strikes on the NIS’s GLOBUS II radar in Vardø (Norway’s easternmost point). The incident was likely intended to signal Moscow’s discontent and frustration over the ongoing construction of the US-funded GLOBUS III radar on the site by 2022, suspecting that the radar would be part of a US early warning system.Footnote⁵⁶

Two months later, 12 Russian aircraft simulated a strike on a maritime group consisting of naval vessels from Norway and other NATO member states, while participating in the anti-submarine Exercise EASTLANT in the northern part of the Norwegian Sea. According to Lunde, the Russian force consisted of MiG-31 interceptors, SU-24 multi-role aircraft and Tu-22M long-range strategic bombers.Footnote⁵⁷ Exercise EASTLANT was also countered by an NFLT naval response, as is customary when NATO forces operate in the northern Norwegian Sea or the Barents Sea. The week after, nine Russian aircraft simulated strikes on the Norwegian Air Force’s air station in Bodø. The simulated attack took place during the Arctic Challenge Exercise, which involved fighter aircraft from several allied countries.Footnote⁵⁸

Although Russian air force activity is routinely intercepted by Norwegian fighter aircraft on NATO Quick Reaction Alert (QRA), the actions described by Lunde were of a character that required a sharp response from the Norwegian authorities, stating that such behaviour is contributing to ‘a decline in confidence, predictability, and stability in the North’.Footnote⁵⁹ Nevertheless, in early 2018, 11 Su-24 aircraft repeated their simulated strikes on the GLOBUS II radar (see Figure 1).Footnote⁶⁰

Figure 1 Flight Patterns of 11 Su-24s Conducting Repeated Simulated Strikes on GLOBUS II in 2018

Source: The Norwegian Intelligence Service.

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Figure 2 Russian PNT Jamming During Trident Juncture 2018

Source: The Norwegian Intelligence Service.

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Another emerging trend is the NFLT’s excessive use of maritime danger areas, referred to in Russian as ‘PRIPs’ (also commonly referred to as Notice to Airmen – NOTAMs).Footnote⁶¹ As these areas are used for anything from small-arms to submarine launched ballistic missile tests, they effectively become maritime exclusion zones. By the end of 2022, the Russian Western Arctic Sea Port Administration had issued 59 PRIPs, compared with 31 for 2021 and 11 in 2020.Footnote⁶² Military danger areas are usually intended to ensure the safety of the issuing authority and those who would otherwise have ventured into the given areas. However, there are indications that PRIPs are used both as a political signalling tool and as a military means for peacetime sea denial. As a political tool, PRIPs have been used to signal dissatisfaction with Norwegian and allied activity in the High North, such as during the NATO exercise Trident Juncture in 2018 and other exercises where Russia has announced disruptive PRIPs within the Alliance’s declared exercise areas.Footnote⁶³ Russian PRIPs are also used as a military means in ways that serve its security strategy by creating temporary ‘geo-fences’ to block or canalise military activity away from areas or activities considered to be sensitive to Russia, such as by obstructing access to the Barents Sea or to observe weapons tests. Since 2014, Russia has also announced numerous PRIPs inside Norway’s exclusive economic zone without apparent military necessity.Footnote⁶⁴ This practice also parallels Russian conduct in the waters and airspace around occupied Crimea.Footnote⁶⁵

PRIPs are also a source of economic loss for those who would otherwise use the sea for civil purposes, such as seasonal fisheries, commerce, air traffic to and from oil and gas platforms, and occasionally to the operation of the platforms themselves.Footnote⁶⁶ While the practice adheres to international law and conforms to international notification requirements, it demonstrates a lack of regard for economic activities and regularly results in complaints from Norwegian fishery organisations claiming that the practice is violating Norway’s sovereign rights.Footnote⁶⁷

On 19 February 2022, Russia activated the most comprehensive PRIPs since the Cold War, in conjunction with executing its delayed Grom (Thunder) strategic nuclear deterrence exercise.Footnote⁶⁸ The PRIPs effectively closed off much of the ice-free parts of the Barents Sea, including large parts of Norway’s economic zone in the region. The PRIPs and the activity within them likely served several national security strategy ends. The exercise demonstrated the viability of Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrence assets, willingness to protect its national interests in the region by ensuring freedom of action and movement, and demonstrating Russian regional military hegemony. In relation to Norway, the exercise signalled a policy change by launching a nuclear-capable 3M22 Zircon hypersonic missile from inside Norway’s economic zone around Bjørnøya (Bear Island). But, more importantly, the exercise demonstrated resolve and the viability of its nuclear deterrence triad only days before its second invasion of Ukraine.

In other maritime incidents, Russian trawlers have been suspected of being involved in damaging vital seabed infrastructure. On 3 April 2021, the Lofoten Vesterålen (LoVe) underwater monitoring cable stopped working. The cable was a joint scientific venture between the Norwegian Institute of Marine Research (Havforskningsinstituttet) and the FFI, intended to monitor maritime acoustic activity. Investigations showed that 4.3 km of cable had disappeared from a location 3 km outside of Norwegian territorial waters and was later recovered 11 km from its original position. The subsequent police investigation concluded that several Russian trawlers had been engaged in trawling at the location and time in question, however, the case was later dropped.Footnote⁶⁹

In another cable incident, one of the two communication cables between Svalbard and mainland Norway ceased to operate on 7 January 2022. The police investigation found that several of the same trawlers as in the previous incident were present in the area, but again, the case was dropped. Space Norway owns and operates the cable which serves as the primary communication line for the population on Svalbard and the Norwegian mainland.Footnote⁷⁰

Although neither of the two cable incidents could be attributed to Russian state involvement, they show the vulnerability of seabed infrastructure, even to relatively simple interference. According to a 2018 study by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Russia has the world’s most developed force for seabed warfare, organised around its Main Directorate for Deep-Sea Research, capable of a wide array of missions, including tapping or severing undersea cables.Footnote⁷¹ According to the study, the Directorate interfered with the 2015 completion of the SweLit undersea power cable in the Baltic Sea, proving its capability and willingness to influence undersea infrastructure.Footnote⁷² Considering Norway’s extensive reliance on undersea infrastructure, especially in the offshore oil and gas sector, such disruptive warfare may represent a severe challenge to Norwegian and European interests, as seen in the 2022 Nord Stream incident where unidentified actors sabotaged the pipelines, rendering them inoperable.

Furthermore, Russia routinely disrupts Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) receivers in northern Norway as a means of political and military signalling. Such actions occur regularly and represent a severe problem by degrading the accuracy of the country’s position, navigation and time (PNT) dependent sectors.Footnote⁷³ Conducting electronic warfare (EW) in peacetime may have catastrophic effects on PNT-dependent platforms, such as aircraft or ships.

The GNSS disruptions initially occurred most frequently from 2017 through the 2018 NATO exercise Trident Juncture and well into 2019. Despite voicing formal complaints to Russian authorities, the EW activity continued and compelled the Norwegian Department of Transportation to gather ‘undisputable evidence’, which concluded that the signal emitters were located on the Kola peninsula.Footnote⁷⁴ Despite objections from the Norwegian MFA, Russia did not end the disruptive and coercive behaviour. Russia only ceased its GNSS disruption operations six months later, following further bilateral talks in June 2019.Footnote⁷⁵

In the incident report on the 2017–2019 GNSS disruptions, the Norwegian Justice Department concluded that the loss of GNSS signals would affect the overall ability to effectively manage civil crisis response preparedness in northern Norway.Footnote⁷⁶ From a military perspective, such low-cost EW can also degrade the effectiveness of high-tech precision-guided munitions (PGM) depending on GPS signals, reducing the overall deterrence effect of the Norwegian or NATO PGM inventory.Footnote⁷⁷ The incidents also show the impact and cost such strategic signalling has across several sectors of Norwegian society, as it demanded a coordinated response from the Ministry of Transport, the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 2022–2023, the EW activity resumed, increasing five-fold compared with 2017–2020, again causing problems for air traffic.Footnote⁷⁸

Russia: A Challenge to Norwegian Interests and Options?

Overall, when considering Russia’s coercive campaign in the diplomatic, information and military domains in the timeframe 2014–2023, it is clear that Moscow’s security policy objectives are related to the Svalbard archipelago, US and NATO forces operating on or out of the Norwegian mainland, and opposition to the 2014 and 2022 sanctions policy. It is also clear that Russia seeks to gain access to otherwise inaccessible security policy related information and advanced technology.

As described, these objectives are pursued through covert, ambiguous or openly coercive sub-threshold activities, and range from official statements, disinformation campaigns, and espionage, to hacking, cyber attacks and military force demonstrations, with the aim of gaining access to government or corporate information, influencing decision-making, and compelling Oslo to comply with its foreign and security policy objectives. However, these activities have been somewhat irregular in both time and intensity.

Russia’s sub-threshold activities towards Norway may be viewed from two different perspectives. On the one hand, they could be seen as evidence of a confident Russia seeking to assert its influence and achieve its objectives by any means necessary. On the other hand, the activities may also be considered as acts of desperation, resulting from a failure to achieve its goals through cooperative and peaceful means. Regardless of the perspective taken, it is clear that Russia’s efforts have succeeded in degrading the relationship between the two nations.

Whether or not Moscow has achieved any of its desired outcomes, its increased risk acceptance and violations of the international rules-based order have created the impression that the Russian bear is wounded, which makes it more dangerous and unpredictable than ever before. ◼